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1Thick Ethical Concepts and the Fact-Value Distinction1
Elijah Millgram
Over the last few years, the ‘fact-value distinction’ (FVD) has become in-
creasingly unfashionable, due in part to a number of arguments adduced
against it. I myself do not believe the FVD can be maintained, and I think
there are good arguments against it. But I have my doubts about the co-
gency of one of the arguments often invoked against it. This argument turns
on ‘thick ethical concepts’ (TECs); I will refer to it as the ‘TEC-argument’.
The TEC-argument is attractive because it proceeds from an uncontroversial
premise—that we grasp and use TECs—to a substantive and controversial
conclusion—that something is wrong with the FVD.2 This sounds too good
to be true; and it is. I intend to show that although the TEC-argument is
frequently invoked, it has never actually been made.
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Here is the TEC-argument as it appears in Bernard Williams’ influential
book Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy:
[S]ubstantive or thick ethical concepts. . . [e.g.,] coward, lie, bru-
tality, gratitude and so forth. . . are characteristically related to
reasons for action. If a concept of this kind applies, this often
provides someone with a reason for action. . .We may say. . . that
such concepts are “action-guiding.”
At the same time, their application is guided by the world. A
concept of this sort may be rightly or wrongly applied, and peo-
ple who have acquired it can agree that it applies or fails to apply
to some new situation. . . . the application of these concepts is at
1Published as “Inhaltsreiche ethische Begriffe und die Unterscheidung zwischen Tat-
sachen und Werten,” in C. Fehige and G. Meggle, Zum moralischen Denken (Frankfurt
a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1995): 354–388. I’m grateful to Suhrkamp for kind permission to post
the English manuscript. The paper was improved by comments from Alyssa Bernstein,
Ruth Chang and Hilary Putnam, as well as members of the Moral and Political Philosophy
Discussion Group at Harvard (Hilary Bok, Andreas Follesdal, and Steve Gross).
2Just what this conclusion would amount to is a question I wish to leave open for the
present; as Hilary Putnam has noted, there are many FVDs, and they tend to be confused
with one another. This point will come up again below.
2the same time world-guided and action-guiding. How can it be
both at once?
The prescriptivist account. . . gives a very simple answer. . .
Any such concept. . . can be analyzed into a descriptive and a
prescriptive element: it is guided round the world by its descrip-
tive content, but it has a prescriptive flag attached to it. . . . All
the input into its use is descriptive, just as all the evaluative as-
pect is output. It follows that, for any concept of this sort, you
could produce another that picked out just the same features of
the world but worked simply as a descriptive concept lacking any
prescriptive or evaluative force.
Against this, critics have made the effective point that there is
no reason to believe that a descriptive equivalent will necessarily
be available. How we “go on” from one application of a concept
to another is a function of the kind of interest that the concept
represents, and we should not assume that we could see how
people “go on” if we did not share the evaluative perspective in
which this kind of concept has its point.3
We need a working definition of ‘thick ethical concept’; let us take a TEC
to be a concept that is both world-guided and action-guiding.4 Williams
takes this argument to “refute the simplest oppositions of fact and value”
(150), though not necessarily the more sophisticated ones, such as that be-
tween science and ethics, which he endorses. There is a strong way and a
weak way to construe this argument. On the weak construal, it could be
read as a challenge. The proponent of the FVD claims that fact and value
can always be distinguished. Fact and value can be found entangled in TECs
that we master and use. The challenge is: distinguish the descriptive and
evaluative components of the TEC, or surrender the claim that they can be
distinguished.
On the strong construal, the argument could be taken as presenting
reasons to think that the demanded factoring into descriptive and evaluative
3Williams, 1985, 140f; further references by page number in the text.
4As we will see, it is not clear that this is a sufficiently robust characterization. For one
thing, all useful concepts are in some way action-guiding. But restricting the application
of the notion to (what is often considered to be) the domain of ethics or morals is also
unsatisfactory, since the (would-be) TECs that most strongly support the TEC-argument
are not drawn from this domain. Finding an adequate characterization of the notion of a
TEC is a task we may insist that the proponent of the TEC-argument be able to perform;
we shall encounter considerations that suggest that this demand is unlikely to be met.
3components cannot be produced. These reasons would have to do with the
notion of a shared evaluative perspective.
Now at first blush it should seem that the demands posed by the weak
version of the TEC-argument can be met. (If this is correct, the stronger
version of the argument is the only viable version; this version would have
to show why, despite appearances, the demands cannot have been met after
all.) A way to shoulder the burden of proof has been described by R. M.
Hare in Freedom and Reason. Our language provides resources for muting
the evaluative force of TECs. For example, one can say things like, “In
describing John’s act as courageous, I don’t mean to be condoning it in any
way”, or, “That would be a kind thing to do—though in saying so I don’t
mean to recommend it”. What is to prevent the proponent of the FVD
from meeting the challenge to factor a given TEC by availing himself of
these resources? Hare proposes doing just this:
It is true that there is no single evaluatively neutral word. . . which
in the present case [that of the TEC ‘courageous’] can be used to
describe such actions without committing the describer to any
evaluation; but we could have such a word. What I shall actu-
ally do, in default of an invented word, is to use the same word
‘courageous’, but to make it clear by my tone of voice or by
putting quotation marks round it, that I am using it in a purely
descriptive sense, implying thereby no commendation whatever.5
For clarity of presentation, I will adopt a slightly different orthographic
convention. For any TEC φ, a term φ∗ can be introduced as picking out its
descriptive component. (We can call this starring the concept.) Then the
demand that the descriptive component be picked out can be met by picking
it out as φ∗. For example, “courageous∗” could be introduced as having the
force of “courageous”, with the evaluative elements muted or masked. If
this technique is acceptable, then the demand for the descriptive equivalent
of a TEC is easily met.
Now it may be objected that concept starring produces a concept that is
parasitic on the TEC used to introduce it, and that therefore it does not sup-
5Hare, 1970, secs. 10.1; cf. also 2.8. Hare returns to the point at Hare, 1981, secs. 1.5
and 4.3. Notice that it is the availability of muting techniques that makes this option
a live one. Without these, proposing to introduce a term Td as having the descriptive
meaning of some other term T would be on a par with, say, trying to introduce a term T ′c
stipulated to have the conventional (or alternatively, the empirical) meaning of a term T ′;
and responding to an attack on the FVD by pointing to Td would be on a par with trying
to defend the analytic-synthetic distinction by pointing to T ′c. (I’m grateful to Hilary
Putnam for bringing this comparison to my attention.)
4port the genuine fact/value discrimination required by the TEC-argument.
However, this is not obviously the case. Let’s distinguish two senses of par-
asitism. Etymological parasitism involves one concept’s having been, as a
matter of historical origin, introduced in terms of the ‘host concept’. For ex-
ample, the concept ‘debugging’ was introduced using the concept ‘bug’, viz.,
‘insect’. Mastery parasitism, by contrast, involves the inability to master,
use or grasp a concept without having mastered or grasped the host concept.
Some functional concepts might be like this: it is hard to see how one could
master the concept ‘hat-rack’ without having grasped the concept ‘hat’. But
it is clear that etymological parasitism does not entail mastery parasitism:
it is easy enough for a novice programmer to learn about debugging without
bringing to bear the concept ‘insect’ in any way.
So if the imputation of parasitism amounts to the claim that the descrip-
tive component φ∗ of φ is etymologically parasitic on φ, it is uncontroversial
but fails to impugn the possibility of an independent grasp of φ∗. But if
the claim is to mean that mastery of φ∗ entails mastery of φ, then, while its
truth might cut against the use of concept starring as an objection to the
TEC-argument, the claim is question-begging if produced without support-
ing argument. (We will see why even mastery parasitism does not necessarily
rule out concept starring as a response to the TEC-argument, below.) It
is simply not the case that “there is no reason to believe that a descrip-
tive equivalent [of a TEC φ] will necessarily be available”. We have seen a
general technique (concept starring) for producing the requisite descriptive
equivalents. Now I am happy to concede that there may well be something
wrong with concept starring; it has an awfully fishy look to it. The point
is just that if the TEC-argument is to go through, Williams owes us an
explanation of just what is wrong with it.
The technique of concept starring which we have adapted from Hare
shows there to be a gap between the uncontroversial premise of the TEC-
argument, to the effect that we grasp and deploy TECs, and its controversial
conclusion, that there is something wrong with the FVD. What the option
of concept starring shows is that there is no direct or obvious connection be-
tween these; until the gap is filled, we do not actually have a TEC-argument
at all—merely a suggestion that such an argument might be produced.
Williams does not produce the argument. He does, however, gesture
at considerations that might be used to bridge the gap between premise
and conclusion. These have to do with the notion of a shared evaluative
perspective. He writes:
An insightful observer can indeed come to understand and antic-
5ipate the use of the concept without actually sharing the values
of the people who use it. . . But in imaginatively anticipating the
use of the concept, the observer also has to grasp imaginatively
its evaluative output. He cannot stand quite outside the evalua-
tive interests of the community he is observing, and pick up the
concept simply as a device for dividing up in a rather strange
way certain neutral features of the world (141f).
Just what Williams means by this is not obvious. To be sure, to “under-
stand and anticipate the use of the concept. . . the observer. . . has to grasp
imaginatively its evaluative point”: this is trivially true, since part of the
use of a TEC (specifically, the evaluative part) is to guide evaluation and
action. But this does not yet address the question of whether the descrip-
tive aspect of the concept can be understood without any such imaginative
grasp of the evaluative point. Williams’ own examples are unhelpful: he
discusses “school slang that uses special names for various objects, places,
and institutions in the school” and “languages in which males and females
use different names for the same thing”; supposedly, “[d]espite its differ-
ences. . . the case of the ethical concept [is] only a deeper example of the
same thing. . . there is a condition that has to be satisfied if one is to speak
in a certain way. . . [which explains] why the observer is barred from saying
just what the locals say, and we can also see that he is not barred from rec-
ognizing that what they say can be true” (143f). It is all too easy to master
this kind of school slang, and such gender-controlled vocabulary, while re-
maining imaginatively oblivious to its evaluative component. (Consider the
teacher who knows his nickname, but not that—or why—it is derogatory; or
many American students of Japanese.) Evidently, the alleged features of a
TEC that we are trying to understand are just those in which it is “deeper”
than—i.e., differs from—the examples Williams gives us. In short, Williams’
point is insufficiently explained.
Not only do we not yet have a clear idea of why Williams takes shared
evaluative perspective to be required for mastery of a TEC’s descriptive
force, but it is also not obvious why even necessarily shared evaluative per-
spective should suffice to “refute. . . oppositions of fact and value”. It would
be implausible to suppose that if you share an evaluative perspective (some-
thing that Williams is obscurely distinguishing from sharing values), then
you can no longer distinguish values from facts—that moral perceptiveness
ineluctably involves a sudden and peculiar blindness. And even if certain
facts can only be discerned by persons occupying a particular evaluative
perspective, this is not yet a demonstration that something is amiss with
6the FVD. Consider the parallel ‘fact-liver distinction’: the claim that (most)
facts are distinct from your liver. Unless you had a liver you would be un-
able to discern those facts; but does this impugn the fact-liver distinction?
Does it ‘refute the simplest oppositions’ of facts and livers? Of course not.
The upshot is that we will have to put a certain amount of work into
developing a plausible construal of Williams’ claim. What this construal
will turn out to be depends, first, on whether we take a minimal condition
on φ∗ being the descriptive equivalent of φ to be identity of extension. If it
is, then we may construe the claim that one cannot master the descriptive
equivalent of a TEC, or use a TEC without grasping its evaluative point, as
follows: mastering certain concepts, i.e., being able to determine to which
individuals they apply, cannot be done without sharing the relevant eval-
uative perspective. There are two possibilities in light of which this claim
can be understood: either the shared evaluative perspective plays a part in
determining the extension of a TEC, or it does not.
If the shared evaluative perspective does not (partly) determine the ex-
tension of a TEC, then the role it plays in permitting mastery of the exten-
sion of the concept, if it is not entirely occult, must be motivational, in the
following way: if I am not an enthusiastic philatelist, I’m not going to be
able to bring myself to master the arcane jargon of stamp-collecting. But
this possibility does not seem to provide any reason to think that descrip-
tive equivalents of TECs cannot be produced (even if only by appropriately
motivated individuals).
If shared evaluative perspective is to pull its own weight in the TEC-
argument, it must therefore play a part in determining the extensions of
TECs. For example, I might apply the concept ‘courageous’ only to actions
which, in addition to exhibiting lack of fear in the face of danger, and so on,
are actions of which I approve. (Hare makes this suggestion at Hare, 1970,
sec. 2.7.) In this case it is plausible that a descriptive equivalent of a TEC,
one that shares its extension with the concept, cannot be produced; but
this conclusion no longer seems to impugn the fact-value distinction, for the
simple reason that the descriptive component of the TEC does not have the
same extension as the TEC. That is, if TECs are thought of in this way, it
is no longer reasonable to insist that a TEC and its ‘descriptive equivalent’
must apply to the same objects. There is still no reason to think that
TECs cannot be understood as involving two distinct sets of criteria (one
descriptive, one evaluative), and consequently as factorable into descriptive
and evaluative components. For example, ‘delicious’ might be thought of as
having a descriptive component (roughly, ‘It’s food of such-and-such a kind’)
and an evaluative component (roughly, “I like it”). To be sure, ‘delicious’
7is not very world-guided; but it seems that to the extent that evaluative
perspective plays a role in determining the extension of a TEC, that TEC
will fail to be world-guided.
The other possibility is that Williams does not intend descriptive equiva-
lence to be merely a matter of identity of extension. Now it is not an unusual
opinion that concepts have more to them than extensions: the concepts ‘an-
imal with a heart’ and ‘animal with a kidney’ have the same extension, but
grasping one concept is not grasping the other, or even grasping the other’s
descriptive equivalent. Perhaps even concepts with necessarily identical ex-
tensions are distinct in this way. (E.g., ‘has three sides’ and ‘has three
angles’.) But this is not enough to undermine the FVD, since insisting that
one must grasp descriptive elements of the concept (over and above its ex-
tension) in order to have mastered its descriptive equivalent still permits
factoring the TEC; whereas requiring a grasp of further evaluative elements
begs the question against the proponent of the FVD.
Evidently Williams has some stronger notion of there being more to
a concept than its extension, and some suitable stronger notion of ‘shared
evaluative perspective’ in mind. This is at any rate suggested by his allusion
to Wittgenstein (“[h]ow we ‘go on’ from one application of a concept to
another”).6 Now we cannot take it for granted that we know which exegetical
reconstruction of the Investigations Williams has in mind. But I am inclined
to attribute to him some such view as this. Grasping a concept—and, a
fortiori, a TEC—just is being able to ‘go on’ in the right way. It is not as
though grasping the concept were an independent factor that explained the
ability, something distinct from ‘going on’ in the appropriate circumstances.
But ‘going on’ in the right way in the case of a TEC means applying it
evaluatively.
This is not to attribute to Williams’ Wittgenstein a crude behaviorist
analysis of grasping a concept—that if you grasp the concept, you do such
and such. The force of ‘going on’ here is expressed with such phrases as “the
kind of interest the concept represents”; in grasping the TEC, we attend to
that interest. It is this that gets called sharing an evaluative perspective.
Just as you don’t understand addition unless you know things like, ‘4’ is the
right answer to ‘What’s 2+2?’, so you don’t grasp the concept ‘courageous’
unless you know things like, being courageous is a good thing.
6Williams further describes “[t]he idea that it might be impossible to pick up an eval-
uative concept unless one shared its evaluative interest” as “basically a Wittgensteinian
idea” (218).
8I can’t give the Wittgensteinian considerations I’m gesturing at the treat-
ment they deserve right here. What’s important for present purposes is that
they’re not a way to fill in the TEC-argument. It is characteristic of the view
I take Williams to have in mind to look at what one does (or at what it is ap-
propriate to do) in particular kinds of circumstances. Appropriate response,
or at any rate, appreciating what responses are appropriate, is constitutive
of being at home in the practice. It follows that such considerations beg the
question against the FVD: if appropriate response (construed not merely as
linguistic or classificatory behavior) is criterial for mastery of the concept,
then it is trivially true that one must share the evaluative perspective to
grasp the TEC.7 Moreover, the considerations in question have nothing to
do with concepts at all, much less TECs: the point is either broader (having
to do with the practices that, generally, constitute our ‘forms of life’), or
more narrow (a matter of what responses are constitutive of mastery of a
particular concept). The Wittgensteinian point directs our attention away
from concepts, away from the propositional understanding of language in
which concepts are functions mapping objects onto truth-values.
In any case, the need to use the heavy machinery of the Investigations de-
prives the TEC-argument of its most attractive and promising feature, that
is, its reliance on an uncontroversial and straightforward premise. Unlike
the claim that we use and grasp TECs, the Wittgensteinian considerations
in question are controversial and ill-understood—in fact, probably the only
point on which Wittgenstein exegetes are likely to agree is that most com-
mentators do not understand Wittgenstein. And finally, note that these
considerations are not yet an argument, but only an indication of the kind
of place where Williams might be inclined to seek one. We have not actually
been given the TEC-argument.
Let me return for a moment to the weaker, burden-of-proof construal
of the argument. To address the demand that descriptive equivalents of
TECs be produced, we invoked concept starring. But it might be claimed
that merely producing a starred concept is not enough. What is needed is
7Conversely, if these considerations were effective, the appeal to TECs would be su-
perfluous. As we just saw, these considerations elicit much the same kind of (admittedly
indirect) action-guiding force from concepts like ‘addition’ as they do from concepts like
‘courageous’.
One might respond that the points of concepts like ‘addition’ are not evaluative. But
what would be the bite of this response? They are certainly action-guiding; and their use
can constitute acts of approval, blame, condemnation, and so on. (Think of the arithmetic
teacher who says: “That’s not even addition.”) Perhaps the suggestion is that they are
action-guiding only when paired with a further, non-descriptive rule; but this would a
peculiar objection to be raised by someone attacking the FVD.
9a definition of the descriptively equivalent concept. This demand is, at any
rate, often suggested by remarks made in the course of presenting the TEC-
argument. To “produce another [concept] that pick[s] out just the same
features of the world but work[s] simply as a descriptive concept lacking
any prescriptive or evaluative force” (140) is not simply to introduce a new
concept as the descriptive equivalent of the TEC in question: it is to define
the new concept.
It is worth saying a little more at this point about what is required of
the demanded definition. First, it must be non-circular; that is, it must not
use the TEC being defined in the definiens. Second, because it is defining
a purely descriptive concept, all concepts used in the definiens must be
themselves non-evaluative. (This condition entails the first.) Third, the
definition and the TEC whose descriptive component is being defined must
designate the same class of individuals.
These are essentially the conditions for the success of a reduction. This
suggests that the demand for such a definition is an expression of the reduc-
tionist reflex that has characterized much of analytic philosophy. I suspect
that the repeated and consistent failure of reductionist projects to satisfy
these demands arises not from some metaphysical or ontological fact (that
this or that kind of thing is not reducible) but from unsurprising verities
about language. There is little reason for the terms of natural languages
to be so definable: they are, by and large, not introduced or learned by
reductive definition; and a new word is needed only when old ones will not
do. Consequently, reductionist definitions should be the exception rather
than the rule, for reasons having to do with the pragmatics of natural lan-
guages and their histories rather than with metaphysics and ontology. If
TECs prove undefinable—as they almost certainly will—this need not have
anything to do with shared evaluative perspectives, or with the supposedly
ineluctable entanglement of fact and value. For we can expect such undefin-
ability to characterize most concepts, regardless of their evaluative status. If
the claim is to carry any weight at all, it would have to be shown, first, that
definitions cannot be produced, and second, that the reason they cannot be
produced cuts against the fact-value distinction.
As on the other points we have discussed, Williams does not provide the
requisite argument. Perhaps this was not his intention; his statement that
“critics have made the effective point that there is no reason to believe that
a descriptive equivalent [of a TEC] will necessarily be available” (141) comes
10
with a footnote to two well-known papers by John McDowell.8 If there is
an argument, perhaps it is to be found there.
2
McDowell’s attempts on “the claim that the problematic perceptions [that
amount to applying TECs] can be analyzed into cognitive and appetitive
components” (346) have more structure than the mere claim that satisfying
the requirement of identity of extension requires shared evaluative perspec-
tive. So if we are dissatisfied with the considerations Williams presents,
examining McDowell’s arguments is evidently the next step.
If a TEC φ can be factored into its cognitive and orectic components φ∗
and φ+, recombining those components in a process of practical reasoning
should produce the same behavior as simply acting on the basis of φ; and
acting on φ∗ + φ+ should seem the same internally as acting from φ: if
recombination is the inverse of factoring, factoring followed by recombination
should be the identity operation. But, thinks McDowell, this condition
(which I will call the recombination condition) cannot be satisfied.
Recombination of φ∗ with φ+ proceeds (McDowell describes his oppo-
nents as claiming) in a pattern that “can take the form of a ‘practical syl-
logism’”, in which “[k]nowledge of the major premise. . . is none other than
the disposition of the will which is required. . . over and above any strictly
cognitive state”, and in which “what is stated in the minor premise. . . [is] a
straightforward fact about a situation at hand, which. . . would be incapable
of eliciting action on its own” (336). Let S be a situation, φ∗(S) represent
φ∗’s applicability in S, and A(S) be an action of type A taken in S. Then
the recombination can be schematized as follows:
φ+: Whenever φ∗(S), do A(S).
φ∗(S)
... Do A(S).9
8McDowell, 1978; McDowell, 1979; further references to the latter by page number in
the text. McDowell endorses the claims that a proponent of the FVDmust hold that a TEC
is analyzable into descriptive and evaluative components, and indirectly endorses the claim
that getting the extension of the concept right requires sharing the concept’s evaluative
perspective (1978, 18, 20). However, he defers “a proper discussion” to elsewhere; I take
it that “Virtue and Reason” is intended to take up the deferred burden.
9Whether the conclusion of the syllogism is supposed to be an action, an intention, a
decision, or something else can be left open for the moment; all that is required is that
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φ+, the orectic component of φ, is accordingly a rule. We can summa-
rize this as the claim that McDowell’s opponents are committed to deductive
recombination.10 I take it that the deductive nature of the recombination
is supposed to capture the requirement that the force of the TEC be recon-
stituted without loss. What McDowell calls “the thesis of uncodifiability”
(345) is the claim that the rule required for the success of the deductive
recombination cannot be formulated:
If one attempted to reduce one’s conception of what virtue re-
quires to a set of rules, then, however subtle and thoughtful one
was in drawing up the code, cases would inevitably turn up in
which a mechanical application of the rules would strike one as
wrong—and not necessarily because one had changed one’s mind;
rather, one’s mind on the matter was not susceptible of capture
in any universal formula. (336)
That is, rather than simply insisting that φ and φ∗ cannot have the same
extension, it is claimed that a φ+ cannot be such that actions triggered by
φ∗ will be the same as those generated by φ. The application of the TEC—
that is, not its mere extension, but its role in practical reasoning—cannot
be reproduced by its factors. But this is to argue that it cannot have been
adequately factored in the first place.
Now the question here is whether the FVD commits its defender to de-
ductive recombination in a way that lays him open to McDowell’s argument.
I will suggest that it does not, and that this can be seen by considering the
role a particular kind of TEC has in the argument. I will call TECs which
are essentially applicable only by a virtuous individual virtue-concepts. Mc-
Dowell considers no other TECs.11
We, however, shall. Consider a concept that is world-guided and action-
guiding, say, ‘winner’ (in a particular kind of game or competition). A judge,
the conclusion be identical with whatever is taken to follow upon an application of the
TEC being factored.
10McDowell repeatedly refers to his opponents’ understanding of such practical syllo-
gisms as the “deductive paradigm” (339, 345); at p. 346 he mentions “our paradigm of
reason, deductive argument.”
11It might be suggested that any thick ethical concept must be a virtue-concept, or
at any rate, have a recognizable connection to virtuousness, and that the example I am
about to introduce is not an example of a TEC at all. (The examples usually given in
the course of presentations of the TEC-argument tend to be of this kind: ‘courageous’,
‘cruel’, ‘pert’, etc.) Recall, however, that the notion of a TEC was introduced in terms of
being world-guided and action-guiding; not surprisingly, virtue requires a good deal more
than that.
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seeing that so-and-so won (application of the concept is world-guided), has
reason to award him the prize (application of the concept is action-guiding).
To reconstruct the practical syllogism that supported the action, we analyze
‘winner’ into ‘winner∗’—the purely cognitive component, picking out such
facts as so-and-so’s having come in first—and ‘winner+’—the orectic com-
ponent that, following McDowell, we can formulate as a rule, say, ‘When x
is the winner∗, award x the prize.’ The reasoning then goes
1. When x is the winner∗, award x the prize.
2. x is the winner∗.
3. Award x the prize.
It might be suggested that the major premise is inadequate because such
reasoning is defeasible: when informed that the mafia has determined that
y is to win instead, a judge might prudently, if not virtuously, refrain from
awarding x the prize. And, to anticipate the proposal that the major premise
be modified to incorporate this exception, recall that not all such exceptions
can be anticipated. But the conclusion, analogous to that developed for
virtue-concepts, that the orectic component of ‘winner’ cannot be codified,
does not follow. For the proponent of the FVD can deny that the practical
syllogism that recombines the components of the TEC in question is to be
interpreted deductively.
The deductive recombination requirement can be derived from the re-
quirement that the practical syllogism reconstitute the force of the TEC
without loss only given the additional condition, that grasping and applying
the TEC suffices fully and univocally to determine one’s response to the sit-
uation in which it is applied. But in ordinary cases, grasping and applying a
TEC does not involve this complete determination: knowing that so-and-so
is the winner need not of itself determine the judge’s response. In these
ordinary cases, the requirement that the practical syllogism reconstitute the
force of the TEC without loss means merely that the indeterminacies in the
response that follows upon an application of the TEC must be reproduced in
the deployment of the corresponding practical syllogism. Not surprisingly,
that is what we find: practical syllogisms are notoriously defeasible.
McDowell’s treatment of virtue-concepts departs from this analysis as
a result of his adopting “the attractive idea that a virtue issues in noth-
ing but right conduct” (332). McDowell identifies “sensitivity”—i.e., the
ability correctly to deploy virtue-concepts—with the virtue. This has as a
consequence that our treatment of the imprudent judge cannot be adapted
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to virtue-concepts: we cannot say that the virtue-concept was correctly ap-
plied, but that wrong action resulted because some other consideration (such
as an offer he was unable to refuse) was not brought to bear; for on Mc-
Dowell’s view, wrong action can never result from the correct application
of a virtue-concept.12 If the application of a virtue-concept is to guaran-
tee such infallibility all by itself, the syllogism that reconstitutes the force
of virtue-concept from its components may not be defeasible.13 The orec-
tic component of the virtue-concept that serves as the major premise of a
practical syllogism must therefore itself codify all the conditions that could
conceivably relate the descriptive component of the virtue-concept to action.
McDowell is correct to think that we have no reason to believe that this is
possible.
Whether the requirement that grasping virtue-concepts guarantee moral
infallibility is part of an adequate understanding of virtue is a question I
do not wish to address here. The question at hand is, what role can such
virtue-concepts play in the TEC-argument? The TEC-argument runs: here
are concepts that cannot be factored into fact and value. Virtue-TECs, if
they exist, have been argued to be unfactorable. But do we have any reason
to believe that anyone has mastered concepts that satisfy McDowell’s crite-
rion of infallibility? If the result of having acquired a virtue-concept is that
one can do no wrong, then we have no reason to believe that anyone has
ever mastered a virtue-concept—or that anyone ever could.14 Accordingly,
while there may be purposes within moral philosophy for which the kind
of idealization embodied in this infallibility claim is useful, supporting the
TEC-argument is not one of them. For the TEC-argument proceeds from
actual concepts; concepts that we grasp (or, at any rate, that human be-
ings like ourselves could plausibly grasp). Not-fully-graspable concepts with
12McDowell does allow that someone may “perceive what the virtuous person
would. . . his failure [to act virtuously] occurring only because his appreciation of what
he perceives is clouded, or unfocused, by the impact of a desire to do otherwise”—i.e.,
a further factor, not part of the reasoning proper, preventing correct application of the
virtue-concept.
13It will follow from this that virtues are unified (McDowell argues this on p. 333) and
that the virtuous individual can have only one genuine orectic state, whose object McDow-
ell identifies with Aristotelian eudaemonia, glossed as “the virtuous person’s conception
of the sort of life a human being should lead” (343).
14McDowell himself acknowledges “the colossal difficulty of attaining the capacity to
cope clear-sightedly with the ethical reality which is part of our world” (347, his emphasis).
Context shows the capacity to be in large part that of applying virtue-concepts. Elsewhere
he concedes that “[t]his view of virtue obviously involves a high degree of idealization,”
but admonishes us that “in a view of what genuine virtue is, idealization is not something
to be avoided or apologized for” (1978, 28).
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near-magical properties cannot play this role in the argument, and are not
convincing counter-examples to the FVD. Appeal to McDowell’s discussion
of the uncodifiability of the virtues consequently fails to fill the gap in the
TEC-argument; and I am aware of no other arguments on his part that
support the TEC-argument.
3
Here is another version of the TEC-argument, presented by Hilary Putnam:
The use of the word ‘inconsiderate’ seems to me a very fine ex-
ample of the way in which the fact/value distinction is hopelessly
fuzzy in the real world and in real language. . . Even though each
of the statements ‘John is a very inconsiderate man’, ‘John thinks
about nobody but himself’, ‘John would do practically anything
for money’ may be simply a true description in the most posi-
tivistic sense. . . , if one has asserted the conjunction of these three
statements it is hardly necessary to add ‘John is not a very good
person’. When we think of facts and values as independent we
typically think of ‘facts’ as stated in some physicalistic or bu-
reaucratic jargon, and the ‘values’ as being stated in the most
abstract value terms, e.g., ‘good’, ‘bad’. The independence of
value from fact is harder to maintain when the facts themselves
are of the order of ‘inconsiderate’, ‘thinks only about himself’,
‘would do anything for money’. (1981, 138f)
Now this is not yet the complete argument. For instance, why can’t we
‘factor’ the TEC ‘considerate’ into a descriptive component considerate∗ and
an evaluative component whose force is roughly ‘Consideration∗ is morally
good’?15 Like the version of the argument we quoted from Williams, the
TEC-argument as here stated is importantly incomplete.
Putnam’s way of filling in the gap runs something like this. The facts that
make up the world in which we live—our Lebenswelt—are value-dependent,
not in the sense that we don’t know how to tease the facts apart from the
values, but in the sense given by the following counterfactual: if the values
15Putnam himself points out that one can ‘mask’ the evaluative force of a word like
‘considerate’, using it “not for the purpose of blaming Jones, but with the intention of
predicting and explaining Jones’ behavior to someone else” (1981, 138). He entertains the
idea that the argument from John’s inconsiderateness to his not being a very good person
involves a specifically evaluative premise on p. 141.
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were different, the facts themselves would be different too. Use of TECs
is part of having the values that constitute the facts. (I will call this the
Lebenswelt argument.)
Putnam supports the claim regarding this dependence of fact on value
by considering the practice of public discourse.
It is all well and good to describe hypothetical cases in which
two people ‘agree on the facts and disagree about values’, but in
the world in which I grew up such cases are unreal. When and
where did a Nazi and an anti-Nazi, a communist and a social
democrat, a fundamentalist and a liberal, or even a Republican
and a Democrat, agree on the facts? Even when it comes to
one specific policy question, say, what to do about the decline of
American education, or about unemployment, or about drugs,
every argument I have ever heard has exemplified the entangle-
ment of the ethical and the factual. (1990, 167)
Because such political dispute often involves disagreement over the use of
TECs, and because of the proximity of this passage to others in the same text
in which Putnam invokes TECs, we may tentatively take this as a filling-out
of the TEC-argument. But a bit of caution is indicated. Political opponents
frequently disagree in just this way over ‘facts’ that are not appropriately
described using TECs. And this raises the possibility that, however cogent
Putnam’s point may be, it is not after all a version of the argument we are
here examining.
Moreover, although it is true enough that political discourse is like this,
this does not suffice to settle the dependence of fact on value. After all, the
sloppiness of political discourse is notorious, and an explanation is close at
hand: when solid evidence is hard to come by, and when people have a large
stake in believing one thing or another, they play fast and loose with the
facts. It is hard to imagine a setting more likely to prompt self-deception in
human beings, and we should not be surprised when most political argument
turns out to look like the expression of such self-deception. The inability
of opposing sides to agree on the facts does not show that facts depend on
values but only that politics brings out the worst in people.
(After all, if the opposing sides actually thought that the ‘facts’ in such
cases really did depend on the values one holds, would they even bother
arguing? Such arguments consist largely of appeal to purported ‘facts’. If it
was thought that one’s opponent could correctly reject the adduced ‘facts’
simply by saying that because his values differ, they are not ‘facts for him’,
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argument would at best be in bad faith. More likely, it would simply be
abandoned in favor of other methods of persuasion or coercion.)
Evidently, then, appeal to actual discourse must be supplemented with
an explanation of why it works the way it does and with argument that
will rule out the null hypothesis of sloppiness and self-deception. The TEC-
argument still needs to be filled out. Putnam has two subsidiary arguments,
which I will now review. I will not attempt fully to develop these arguments;
this would be a task lying beyond the scope of this paper. The brief dis-
cussion of each that I will present will suffice, however, to demonstrate that
neither is a completion of the TEC-argument.
Putnam’s first argument (which I will call the cookie cutter argument)
is developed using his example of the ‘super-Benthamites’, whose different
value system will lead to their evolving a conceptual apparatus alternative
to our own, and involving the use of TECs other than ours. As this happens,
The texture of the human world will begin to change. In the
course of time the super-Benthamites and we will end up living
in different human worlds. . . it will not be the case that we and
the super-Benthamites ‘agree on the facts and disagree on the
values’. In the case of almost all interpersonal situations, the
description we give of the facts will be quite different from the
description they give of the facts. (1981, 141)
Now it is true that we and the super-Benthamites will be, to use an old
metaphor, equipped with different sets of cookie cutters, and will cut up the
world differently. But, it may be responded, both sets of facts are equally
sets of facts; they differ only in the purposes and values that make attending
to them relevant. We can agree that their facts are facts—albeit facts only
ruthless bureaucrats with “a sick system of values” would consider to be the
important ones. And they can agree our facts are facts as well, even if facts
that would be attended to only by “soft-headed, superstitious, prisoners of
irrational tradition” (140). Why is it right to say that the facts depend on
the values, rather than—something with which no-one will take issue—that
the selection of the facts depends on the values?
Putnam replies:
Even if none of the statements they make about the situation
are false, their description will not be one that we will count as
adequate and perspicuous; and the description we give will not
be one that they could count as adequate and perspicuous. In
short, even if we put aside our ‘disagreement about the values’,
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we could not fully regard their total representation of the human
world as rationally acceptable. (141)
Recall that for Putnam, “rationally acceptable” functions as an approxi-
mation to “true”; Reason, Truth and History argues for a view of truth as
idealized rational acceptability. The upshot is that the super-Benthamite de-
scription of the human world will be, by our lights, not true. If we take this
global description to answer to a global fact that is the sum of the many in-
dividual facts presented by the statements made by the super-Benthamites,
then to say that the description is not true is to say that the putative global
fact is, after all, not a fact.16 Evidently, then, we have facts (at any rate,
the global facts) depending on values, by way of the TECs it is appropriate
to deploy.
There are two problems with this argument. The first is that although
the argument, or this particular version of it, mentions TECs, it is not a
version of the TEC-argument. TECs are used only inessentially in the argu-
ment, which turns on the requirement that the relevant facts be adduced if a
description is to be adequate. Sometimes the relevant facts will be described
using TECs, and TECs are convenient for illustrating the argument’s point.
But the same argument could be made without mentioning TECs, and in-
deed Putnam produces an example in which failing to use furniture-concepts
in the description of a room condemns it as inadequate.17 (And—although
this point is hard to put cleanly—the mere existence of TECs is not suf-
ficient to get the argument going, for if there were, somehow, only one
possible description of the world, the argument would not go through, re-
gardless of whether that sole description used TECs or not.) In short, the
TEC-argument is an argument that proceeds from the existence or grasp or
use of TECs to the claim that the fact-value distinction cannot be made;
but even if the cookie-cutter argument arrives at the same conclusion, it
does not proceed from the same starting point, and so it is not the same
16It might be objected that this view takes Putnam as being willing to acknowledge that
a conjunction of truths need not be true. But notice that Putnam does not characterize
the super-Benthamites’ statements as true: he says, “[e]ven if none of the statements
they make about the situation are false, their description will not be one that we will
count as adequate and perspicuous” (1981; 141). On the internal realist view, there is
a gap between ‘true’ and ‘not false’: it could well be that neither a statement nor its
contrary is rationally acceptable. This state of affairs is particularly likely to arise where
the statement and its contrary are inadmissible in virtue of deploying an unacceptable bit
of conceptual apparatus, such as an inappropriate TEC.
17Putnam, 1981, 138; he also points out that one of the loaded facts from which the




What is doing the work in the cookie-cutter argument is the internal
realist view that truth is idealized rational acceptability. To pick out some-
thing as a fact is just to pick out its description as true; facts have values
built right into them, specifically, those values invoked by the notion of ra-
tional acceptability. The argument, as just outlined, does not seem to turn
on our general ability to grasp and use TECs (although it does deploy a
particular TEC, ‘rationally acceptable’), and so is not a version of the TEC-
argument. Because this argument is not a version of the TEC-argument,
further development of it would lie beyond the scope of this paper. I note
only that, even if it works, it does not serve the same dialectical function as
the TEC-argument. Unlike the TEC-argument, which proceeds from the un-
controversial and concrete fact that we grasp and use TECs, this argument
cannot get off the ground unless one first accepts the doctrines, both more
general and more controversial, argued for in Reason, Truth and History.
The TEC-argument, if valid, can be used to convince just about anybody.
The argument from internal realism will convince only those who believe
that internal realism is true.
A second argument is the argument from the softness of counterfactu-
als.18 Take a counterfactual of the form p ↪→ q to have the interpretation,
q holds in the closest possible worlds in which p holds. Then whether the
counterfactual is true will in general depend on which possible worlds are
closest. But closeness of possible worlds is a matter of relevant similarity,
and what counts as relevant similarity will vary depending on what one
thinks is important (one’s ‘values’) and on what conceptual apparatus one
uses to pick out the features of different possible worlds—inter alia, which
TECs one deploys. Since many facts are (despite the superficial linguistic
opposition) constituted by counterfactuals,19 it would follow that these facts
vary along with one’s values, and, more specifically, along with which TECs
one deploys to pick out features of possible worlds that are used to judge
their similarity or ‘closeness’.
An illustration may help here. L (an American with leftist political
views) and R (an American with rightist political views) disagree about
whether the Khmer Rouge would have massacred all those people if the US
had not secretly bombed Cambodia. R takes the nearest possible worlds
in which the bombing did not take place to be worlds in which the Khmer
18This move was suggested to me by Putnam (in conversation).
19The canonical example of this, due, I think, to Amartya Sen, is the distinction between
starving and fasting: whether I am starving or fasting depends on whether I could eat if
I wanted to.
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Rouge are Communist genocidal lunatics (this feature being made salient
by his Republican values, which lead him to deploy the relevant TECs). L,
on the other hand, takes the nearest possible worlds to be those in which
the Khmer Rouge are benevolent social reformers. (He may concede that
this description does not hold of the actual world, but attribute this to the
bombing: the closest worlds in which the bombing did not take place hold
Khmer Rouge benevolent social reformers.) With only moderate exagger-
ation, we may suppose that L regards ‘Communist genocidal lunatics’ as
an oxymoron, and that this TEC is unavailable to him; and similarly, that
the notion of a ‘benevolent social reformer’ is unavailable to R: this allows
the availablility and use of TECs to play an explicit role. Picking out the
different sets of ‘close’ possible worlds using these TECs allows the two to
affirm contrary counterfactuals. L holds that had they not been provoked by
the bombing, benevolent social reformers would not have engaged in geno-
cide. R believes that Communist genocidal lunatics are likely to commit
atrocities whether provoked or not. The ‘fact’ of who is responsible for the
Cambodian genocide turns out to depend on one’s values, and the channel
through which value shapes fact is the use of TECs in determining the truth
of counterfactuals.
Again, however, the argument does not employ TECs essentially. In-
dividuals with different values could, in light of those values, find different
features the appropriate ones with which to pick out similar or close possible
worlds, where those features are not picked out by TECs. (And again, the
mere existence of TECs does not suffice to make the argument go through:
for if concepts (somehow) had ‘objective similarity weights’ that settled what
role the concepts had in determining an objective similarity metric over pos-
sible worlds, the argument would not go through even if some of those con-
cepts were TECs.) Although TECs are useful for illustrating the force of
the argument, the argument from the softness of counterfactuals turns out
not to be a version of the TEC-argument.
The TEC-argument seems appealing because it moves from an uncon-
troversial premise (we use TECs) to a controversial conclusion (the FVD is
mistaken). If the gap in the TEC-argument could only be filled in by in-
voking controversial premises that, if accepted, themselves refute the FVD
without further appeal to TECs, then the TEC-argument itself would prove
superfluous and ineffective. When Putnam’s arguments are disentangled,
they turn out to have just this structure—the arguments do not invoke
TECs in any essential way (although they are illustrated with examples
that involve TECs), and the premises are far more controversial than the
one that makes the TEC-argument look so attractive.
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Iris Murdoch’s short but dense book, The Sovereignty of Good, is cited by
both Putnam and McDowell.20 It is clear that Putnam, at least, regards
The Sovereignty of Good as the original locus of the TEC-argument:
Murdoch was the first to emphasize that languages have two
very different sorts of ethical concepts: abstract ethical concepts
(Williams calls them ‘thin’ ethical concepts), such as ‘good’, and
‘right’, and more descriptive, less abstract concepts (Williams
calls them ‘thick’ ethical concepts) such as, for example, cruel,
pert, inconsiderate, chaste. Murdoch (and later, and in a more
spelled-out way, McDowell) argued that there is no way of say-
ing what the ‘descriptive component’ of the meaning of a word
like cruel or inconsiderate is without using a word of the same
kind. . . ” (1990, 166)
Murdoch herself does not refer to any further sources of the TEC-argument;
evidently the trail ends here. If we do not find a satisfactory rendering of
the TEC-argument here, we may take it that there is none to be found in
the literature.
However, it would be surprising to find the TEC-argument in The Sov-
ereignty of Good, simply because Murdoch’s interests are largely orthogonal
to those of advocates of the TEC-argument. TECs are thought of by these
advocates as concepts that are essentially world-guided and action-guiding;
these are the features that make them interesting and important. But while
Murdoch does think TECs can be action-guiding,21 this is not her primary
concern, and she carefully constructs her central example of a mother and
her daughter-in-law (much alluded to by advocates of the TEC-argument)
20Murdoch, 1970; further references by page number in the text. Cf. Putnam, 1981,
139; Putnam, 1990, 166f; McDowell 1979, notes 35–37. Williams mentions a seminar with
Murdoch and Foot—but not The Sovereignty of Good—as the source of “[t]he idea that
it might be impossible to pick up an evaluative concept unless one shared its evaluative
interest” (218n7).
21Murdoch says that “the agent. . . will be saying ‘This is A B C D’ (normative-
descriptive words), and action will follow naturally” (42). “One is often compelled almost
automatically by what one can see” (37). She speaks repeatedly of “a world which is
compulsively present to the will”; “we cannot suddenly alter what we can see and ergo
what we desire and are compelled by” (39): “Man. . . is a unified being who sees, and
who desires in accordance with what he sees. . . ” (40, her emphases). While this is not
the place to attempt to explicate Murdoch’s view of decision and action, the recurring
suggestions of automaticity and compulsion point to a dark picture of something other
than reasoned action on the basis of reasoned application of TECs.
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so that the TECs in question will be action-neutral, rather than action-
guiding: “whatever is in question as happening happens entirely in M’s
mind” (17, emphasis hers). Murdoch’s concern is to present a picture of
inner moral activity, activity that, unlike action, is not public. It is this
inward activity—roughly, the refining of one’s moral vision—that “could
be described in. . . one very natural way. . . by use of specialized normative
words, what one might call the secondary moral words in contrast to the
primary and general ones such as ‘good’ ” (22). Her TECs, or TEC-analogs,
are picked out not by their being action-guiding, but by the role they play
in a certain kind of inner moral development.
Moreover, Murdoch regards applications of TECs as reality- rather than
world-guided; ‘reality’ is here a proprietary term. “M [the mother-in-law
of her example] is not forced to adopt these [here, psychoanalytic] concepts
at all, in preference say to any particular set of moral or religious con-
cepts” (27). Rather, “a refined and honest perception of what is really [!]
the case. . . is the result not simply of opening one’s eyes but of a certainly
perfectly familiar kind of moral discipline” (38), one that sees not merely
“accurately but. . . justly and lovingly” (23). Murdoch acknowledges that
“[p]hilosophical difficulties may arise if we try to give any single organized
background sense to the normative word ‘reality’”, as she is using it (40),
and I do not propose to enter upon an exploration of those difficulties here.
Suffice it for present purposes that the application of TECs, controlled by
such a morally-imbued ‘reality’, is not world-guided in a way that is likely
to support the TEC-argument. (Murdoch’s example of responsiveness to
‘reality’ involves the substitution of one set of TECs for another, e.g., ‘de-
lightfully youthful’ for ‘tiresomely juvenile’ (17f). But pairs of TECs of this
kind (others might be ‘frugal’ and ‘cheap’) suggest, if anything, not the in-
extricable entanglement of fact and value, but an easily made distinction
between the factual component shared by two loaded expressions and their
evaluative or orectic remainders.)
Finally, the contrasts Murdoch is developing have little to do with the
concerns of later advocates of the TEC-argument. ‘Good’ is not, on Mur-
doch’s view, a thin ethical concept (that is a mistake she attributes to the
“existentialist-behaviorist view” she is attacking (41)), but rather, infinitely
thick (cf. 46ff). And what Murdoch takes to be “especially characteristic of
normative words” (33) is the importance of their location within an individ-
ual’s inner history: “hard” “fact” is being contrasted not with value-infected
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and -softened fact, but with private fact (24f, 33).22
Given this divergence of interests, it should not be surprising that when
one turns to The Sovereignty of Good, the TEC-argument is simply not to be
found. Murdoch does attack the fact-value distinction, but she does this by
attacking the moral psychology that, she believes, underwrites its adoption.
(This is a line of attack that I myself believe should be taken very seriously.)
She regards the philosophical tendency to ignore TECs as symptomatic of
a pernicious body of doctrine in philosophy of mind and ethics:
It is not characteristic of the man [it] describ[es]. . . to possess an
elaborate normative vocabulary. Modern ethics analyses ‘good’,
the empty action word which is the correlate of the isolated will,
and tends to ignore other value terms.23
On Murdoch’s view, however,
the primary general words could be dispensed with entirely and
all moral work could be done by the secondary specialized words
(42, my emphases).
As the phrases I have italicized show, the connection between the doctrine
she is attacking and its preference of thin over thick ethical concepts is not
direct enough to support anything like the Modus Tollens that would be
needed to constitute the backbone of a TEC-argument; and even if it were,
the moral psychology in question is not yet the FVD, but only, once again,
indirectly (albeit importantly) connected to it. Interestingly, although Mur-
doch frequently invokes TECs in her attempt to show this body of doc-
trine false to our moral experience, she insists that her argument could also
have been made “in terms of. . . visual imagery, or in simple or complex
metaphors” (18).
Of the claim that TECs cannot be factored into descriptive and nor-
mative components—much less an argument for that claim—there is no
trace. And of an argument that the use of TECs entails the falsity of the
FVD (rather than merely that a correct picture of moral development is
naturally given using TECs), there is, again, no trace. Its appearance in
22Murdoch goes on to suggest that her treatment of normative concepts can be extended
to such non-ethical concepts as ‘red’ (29). But, as we have already remarked, if the features
of TECs that have been taken to show fact and value to be indistinguishable are common
to such concepts as ‘red’, then the consequences of such features for the FVD become
non-obvious.
238, my emphases. The emptiness of ‘good’ is of course being attributed to her oppo-
nents’ understanding of it and is not Murdoch’s own view.
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citations notwithstanding, The Sovereignty of Good is not a locus of the
TEC-argument.
5
We have reached the end of the trail, and it turns out that the missing
TEC-argument is precisely that.24 To the best of my knowledge, that ar-
gument has simply not been made. This fact does not, of course, suffice
to rehabilitate the fact-value distinction: there are, I believe, other cogent
arguments against it. Some of the arguments that were touched upon in the
course of distinguishing them from the TEC-argument may be among these;
I am in particular sympathetic to Murdoch’s attempt to see the FVD as
derived from a mistaken moral psychology. But the TEC-argument should
not be accepted as grounds for rejecting the fact-value distinction until it is
actually produced.
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